The Evolutionary Basis of Collective Action by Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis
The Evolutionary Basis of CollectiveAction
Samuel Bowles
Herbert Gintis∗
April 20, 2006
1 Introduction
Many aspects of political behavior have been illuminated by standard models in
which political actors maximize self-interested preferences. The works of Downs
(1957), Buchanan and Tullock (1962),Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (1980) and
Becker (1983), as well as those inspired by these seminal contributions, have con-
tributed to our understanding of voter, party and policy preferences, interest group
politics, rent-seeking, coalition formation, bargaining and other aspects of polit-
ical behavior. Using this framework, works on electoral support for the welfare
state (Benabou and Ok 2001, Moene and Wallerstein 2002), informal enforcement
of contracts (Greif 1994, Greif, Milgrom and Weingast 1994), the efﬁciency of
democraticgovernance(Wittman1989), nationalism(Breton, Galeotti, Salmonand
Wintrobe 1995) and ethnic conﬂict (Varshney 2003) have produced important and
sometimes surprising insights.
YetasOstrom(1998)andothershavepointedout,anumberofcriticalaspectsof
political behavior remain difﬁcult to explain within this framework. These include
thefactthatpeoplebothertovoteatall,andelectoralsupportforcostlyredistributive
programs from which the voter concerned is unlikely to beneﬁt and for which he
will certainly pay additional taxes (Luttmer 2001, Fong 2001, Fong, Bowles and
Gintis 2005), and many forms of political violence (Stern 2003). Among the more
striking examples of the shortcomings of the standard model is the large class of
political behavior that takes the form of voluntary contribution to public goods.
Included is participation in joint political activities and other forms of collective
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action (Moore, Jr. 1978, Wood 2003, Scott 1976), the adherence to social norms
(Young and Burke 2001,Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein 1998), and the punishment
ofthoseviolatingsocialnorms(Mahdi1986,Harding1978,Boehm1993,Wiessner
2005).
Whenoneismotivatedtobearpersonalcoststohelportohurtotherswesaythat
one has other-regarding preferences, meaning that affecting the states experienced
by someone other than oneself is part of one’s motivations. Unlike the conven-
tional self-regarding preferences of Homo economicus, social preferences are other
regarding. Generosity towards others, and punishing those who violate norms are
commonly motivated by other-regarding preferences.
We use the term self-regarding rather than “selﬁsh” to describe the standard
assumptions about preferences to avoid the circularity arising from the fact that all
uncoerced actions are motivated by preferences and hence might confusingly be
termed selﬁsh, leaving only those actions that violate one’s preference ordering to
be called unselﬁsh (but would better be called non-rational). To explain behavior,
both other-regarding and self regarding preferences must be transitive, and when
they are (as we assume) the actions they motivate are rational in the strict sense
typically adopted in economics and decision theory. The common designation of
generous behavior as “irrational” is based on a gratuitous conﬂation of rationality
and self-regarding preferences.
We explore two problems in the study of the political behaviors supporting
collective action. The ﬁrst concerns the view frequently advanced by economists
and biologists that cooperative behaviors can be fully explained on the basis of self-
interestedmotivations, onceonetakesaccountoftherepeatednatureofinteractions
and the degree of genetic relatedness among members of a cooperating group. We
show that repeated interactions and kin-based altruism, while strong inﬂuences on
behavior in many settings, do not provide an adequate account of the forms of
cooperation observed in natural and experimental settings.
Theseandothertypesofpoliticalbehaviorarebasedonpreferencesthatinclude
a concern for the well being of others and a taste not only for fairness but also for
retribution. We review recent behavioral experiments documenting the variety and
extentofthesesocalledsocialpreferencesandthemannerinwhichtheexistenceof
evenaminorityofindividualswithsocialpreferencescandramaticallyaffectgroup
behavior (see Bowles and Gintis (2007b), Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr (2005),
and Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr and Gintis (2004) for a more extensive
review of this evidence).
The second is the puzzle of how these social preferences could have evolved
by means of genetic transmission and natural selection, cultural learning and so-
cialization, or both. The puzzle arises because the political behaviors motivated by
social preferences are often altruistic in the biological sense—of conferring gains
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on others in one’s group while entailing costs—and altruistic behaviors will be
disadvantaged in most evolutionary processes that favor higher payoff types. Our
treatment of these topics is necessarily cursory, drawing extensively on work pre-
sented more fully in Bowles and Gintis (2007a), Gintis et al. (2005), and Henrich
et al. (2004).
2 The Cooperative Species
Cooperation among humans is unique in nature, extending to a large number of
unrelated individuals and taking a vast array of forms. By cooperation we mean
engaging with others in a mutually beneﬁcial activity. Cooperative behavior may
confer beneﬁts net of costs on the individual cooperator, and thus may be motivated
by entirely self-regarding preferences. In this case, cooperation is a form of what
biologists call mutualism, namely an activity that confers net beneﬁts both on the
actor and on others.
But, cooperation may also incur net costs to the individual. In this case cooper-
ativebehaviorconstitutesaformofaltruism. Incontrasttomutualisticcooperation,
altruisticcooperationwouldnotbeundertakenbyanindividualwhosemotiveswere
entirely self-regarding and thus did not take account of the effects of one’s actions
on others.
While the high frequency of altruistic cooperation in humans relative to other
species could be an evolutionary accident, a more plausible explanation is that
altruistic cooperation among humans is the result of capacities that are unique to
our species and that strongly promote our relative reproductive ﬁtness. Thus, we
seek an explanation of cooperation that works for humans, but which, because it
involves capacities that are unique to humans, does not work for other species, or
works substantially less well.
Central to our explanation will be human cognitive, linguistic and physical
capacities that allow the formulation of general norms of social conduct, the emer-
gence of social institutions regulating this conduct, the psychological capacity to
internalize norms, and the capacity to base group membership on such non-kin
characteristicsasethnicityandlinguisticdifferences, whichinturnfacilitatescostly
conﬂicts among groups. Also important is the unique human capacity to use pro-
jectile weapons, a consequence of which is to lower the cost of punishing norm
violators within a group, and to render intergroup conﬂicts more lethal.
Thus, our account of human sociality and its evolution hinges critically on a
reconsideration of the canonical economic model of self-interested behavior. But
morethanindividualmotivationisinvolved. Theextraordinarylevelsofcooperation
observed in human society cannot be attributed simply to our generosity towards
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those with whom we interact or our capacity to favor the advancement of our nation
orethnicgroupoverourindividualwell-being. Theregulationofsocialinteractions
by group-level norms and institutions plays no less a role than altruistic individual
motives in understanding how the cooperative species came to be. The institutions
that regulate behaviors among non-kin affect the rewards and penalties associated
with particular behaviors, often favoring the adoption of cooperative actions over
others. Inthesocialenvironmentscommontohumaninteractions,theself-regarding
are often induced to act in the interest of the group. Of course it will not do to
posit these rules and institutions a priori. Rather, we show that these could have
co-evolved with other human traits in a plausible representation of the relevant
ecologies and social environments.
Cooperation is not an end to be valued in its own right, but rather is a means
that under some conditions may contribute to human well being. In other settings,
competition plays no less essential a role. Similarly, the individual motives and
group-level institutions that account for cooperation among humans include not
only the most elevated—a concern for others, fair-mindedness, and democratic ac-
countabilityofleaders,forexample—butalsothemostvenal: vengeance,exclusion
of “outsiders,” and frequent warfare among groups, for example.
Our reasoning is disciplined in three ways. First, the forms of cooperation we
seektoexplainareconﬁrmedbynaturalobservation,historicalaccounts,andbehav-
ioralexperiments. Second,ouraccountisbasedonaplausibleevolutionarydynamic
involving some combination of genetic and cultural transmission, the consistency
of which can be demonstrated through formal modeling. Third, agent-based simu-
lations show that our models can account for human cooperation under parameter
values consistent with what can be reasonably inferred about the environments in
which humans evolved.
3 Mutualistic Cooperation
Because mutualistic cooperation will be sustained by individuals with entirely self-
regarding preferences, it is treated in standard biological and economic models as
an expression of self-interest. “Natural selection favors these…behaviors,” wrote
Robert Trivers in his “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism” (1971), “because in
the long run they beneﬁt the organism performing them.…two individuals who risk
their lives to save each other will be selected over those who face drowning on
their own.” (pp. 34–35) Cooperation, in Trivers’interpretation is simply symbiosis
with a time lag. Trivers’ explanation initially found favor among biologists and
economists because it is consistent with both the common biological reasoning that
naturalselectionwillnotfavoraltruisticbehaviorsandwiththecanonicaleconomic
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assumption of self interest.
Trivers identiﬁed the conditions under which assisting another would be re-
ciprocated in the future with a likelihood sufﬁcient to make mutual assistance a
form of mutualism. These conditions favoring reciprocal altruism included an ex-
tended lifetime, mutual dependence and other reasons for limited dispersal so that
groups remain together, extended periods of parental care, attenuated dominance
hierarchies, and frequent combat with conspeciﬁcs and predators. Foraging bands
of humans, he pointed out, exhibit all of these conditions. Michael Taylor (1976)
and RobertAxelrod andWilliam Hamilton (1981) subsequently formalizedTrivers’
argument using the theory of repeated games. In economics, analogous reasoning
is summarized in the Folk Theorem, which shows that cooperation among self-
regarding individuals can be sustained as long as interactions are expected to be
repeated with sufﬁcient frequency and individuals are not too impatient (Fudenberg
and Maskin 1986, Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin 1994).
But, in many important human social environments, Trivers’conditions favor-
ing reciprocal altruism do not hold, yet cooperation among non-kin is commonly
observed. These include contributing to common projects when community sur-
vival is threatened, and cooperation among very large numbers of people among
who do not share common knowledge of one another’s actions. In fact, the scope
of application of the Folk Theorem is quite restricted, especially in groups of any
signiﬁcant size, once the problem of cooperation is posed in an evolutionary setting
andaccountistakenof“noise”arisingfrommistakenbehaviorsandmisinformation
about the behaviors of others.
A plausible model of cooperation must satisfy the following ﬁve conditions.
First, it must be incentive compatible. In particular, those who provide the rewards
and inﬂict punishments dictated by the rules for cooperation must have the motiva-
tiontodoso. Second, amodelmustbedynamicallystable, inthesensethatrandom
ﬂuctuations,errors,andmutations(theemergenceofnovelstrategies)donotdisrupt
cooperation or entail excessive efﬁciency losses. Third, the organizational forms
and incentive mechanisms deployed in the model must reﬂect the types of strate-
gic interaction and incentives widely observed in human groups. In particular, the
model should work well with group sizes on the order of ten to twenty, and the in-
centivetopunishdefectorsshouldreﬂectthosedeployedinreal-worldpublicgoods
game settings. Fourth, the model should not require extraordinary informational
requirements. Finally the model should work with plausible discount factors.I t
is reasonable to suppose that within a group faced by a public goods game, there
will be a distribution of discount factors among members, and average discount
factors can be high in some periods and low in others, as the probability of group
dissolution rises and falls.
A careful analysis shows that all models of cooperation based on tit-for-tat
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andrelatedrepeatedgamestrategieswhenplayedamongself-interestedindividuals
violate these conditions, and hence fail to solve the problem of cooperation among
unrelated agents.1 First, reciprocal altruism fails when a social group is threatened
with dissolution, since members who sacriﬁce now on behalf of group members do
not have a high probability of being repaid in the (highly uncertain) future.
Second, many human interactions in the relevant evolutionary context took
the form of n-person public goods games—food sharing and other co-insurance,
upholding social norms among group members, information sharing, and common
defense—rather than dyadic interactions. The difﬁculty in sustaining cooperation
in public goods games by means of the standard tit-for-tat and related repeated
gamestrategiesincreasesexponentiallywithgroupsize(BoydandRicherson1988,
Bowles and Gintis 2007a), even if interactions are repeated with high probability.
Thereasonisthatingroupslargerthantwo, withdrawingcooperationinresponseto
a single defection imposes a blanket punishment on all, defectors and cooperators
alike. But, targeting punishment on defectors alone does not work in large groups
unless members have unrealistically accurate information about the actions taken
by others.
Third, the contemporary study of human behavior has documented a large class
of social behaviors inexplicable in terms of reciprocal altruism. For instance, there
is extensive support for income redistribution in advanced industrial economies,
even among those who cannot expect to be net beneﬁciaries (Fong, Bowles and
Gintis, 2005). Under some circumstances group incentives for large work teams
are effective motivators even when the opportunity for reciprocation is absent and
thebeneﬁtsofcooperationaresowidelysharedthataself-interestedgroupmember
would gain from free-riding on the effort of others (Ghemawat 1995, Hansen 1997,
Knez and Simester 2001). Finally, laboratory and ﬁeld experiments show that
other-regarding motives are frequently robust causes of cooperative behavior, even
in one-shot, anonymous settings.
4 Strong Reciprocity: Evidence from Behavioral Experiments
A more direct reason for doubting the interpretation that most cooperation is mutu-
alistic is given by the compelling evidence that many (perhaps most) people behave
in ways inconsistent with the assumption that they are motivated by self-regarding
1ThisanalysisispresentedinfullinGintis(2004)andBowlesandGintis(2007a),whichalsoshows
that recent game-theoretic extensions of these models using repeated game theory (Fudenberg and
Maskin1986,Fudenbergetal.1994,Sekiguchi1997,Piccione2002,ElyandVälimäki2002,Bhaskar
and Obara 2002, Matsushima 2000, Kandori 2002) do not alter this conclusion. These contributions,
while important in their own right, either suffer the same problems discussed in the text, or they are
not stable in a dynamic setting.
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preferences. A suggestive body of evidence points to the importance of a suite of
behaviors that we call strong reciprocity. A strong reciprocator comes to a new
social situation with a predisposition to cooperate, is predisposed to respond to co-
operative behavior on the part of others by maintaining or increasing his level of
cooperation, and responds to anti-social behavior on the part of others by retaliat-
ing against the offenders, even at a cost to himself, and even when he cannot not
reasonably expect future personal gains from such retaliation. The strong recipro-
catoristhusbothaconditionallyaltruisticcooperator andaconditionallyaltruistic
punisher whose actions beneﬁt other group members at a personal cost. We call
this “strong reciprocity” to distinguish it from “weak” (i.e., self-regarding) forms
of reciprocity, such as Trivers’reciprocal altruism.
Strongreciprocityisanexampleofalargerclassofso-calledsocialpreferences
which describe the motivations of people who care (one way or the other) about the
well being of others, and have preferences not only over the states they and others
experience but also care about how the states came about.
In the ultimatum game, under conditions of anonymity, two players are shown
a sum of money, say $10. One of the players, called the “proposer,” is instructed to
offer any number of dollars, from $1 to $10, to the second player, who is called the
“responder.” The proposer can make only one offer. The responder, again under
conditions of anonymity, can either accept or reject this offer. If the responder
accepts the offer, the money is shared accordingly. If the responder rejects the
offer, both players receive nothing.
Since the game is played only once and the players do not know each other’s
identity, a self-interested responder will accept any positive amount of money.
Knowing this, a self-interested proposer will offer the minimum possible amount,
$1,andthiswillbeaccepted. However,whenactuallyplayed,theself-interestedout-
come is never attained and never even approximated. In fact, as many replications
of this experiment have documented, under varying conditions and with varying
amounts of money, proposers routinely offer respondents very substantial amounts
(50%ofthetotalgenerallybeingthemodaloffer),andrespondentsfrequentlyreject
offersbelow30%(CamererandThaler1995,GüthandTietz1990,Roth, Prasnikar,
Okuno-Fujiwara and Zamir 1991).
Strong reciprocity emerges in many other experimental games, some of which
are described inTable 1 (from Camerer and Fehr, 2003). In all cases, given the one-
shot, anonymousnatureofthegame, self-regardingagentswouldneithercontribute
to the common good, or reward others for so contributing. Nor would they punish
others for failing to contribute. Yet, in each game, under many different conditions
and in different cultures, a considerable fraction of agents contributes, and enough
agents punish free-riding that even the self-regarding agent often contribute simply
to avoid punishment.
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5 The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity
If preferences were entirely self-regarding,the extent of human cooperation would
indeed be puzzling. But if social preferences are common, the puzzle takes a some-
what different form: how might strong reciprocity and other altruistic preferences
thatsupportcooperationhaveevolvedoverthecourseofhumanhistory? Thepuzzle
is posed especially clearly if the processes of cultural and genetic evolution favor
behavioral traits that on the average are associated with higher levels of material
success. We think that this assumption of what is called a payoff monotonic dy-
namic is not entirely adequate. But Gintis (2000) and Bowles and Gintis (2004)
adopt just such an evolutionary model to show that individuals behaving as strong
reciprocators can proliferate in a population in which they were initially rare, and
that their presence in a population could sustain high levels of cooperation among
group members.
One intuition behind these models is that in groups with strong reciprocators
present,groupmemberswhoseself-regardingpreferencesleadthemtoshirkoncon-
tributing to common projects will be punished by being ostracized from the group.
Strong reciprocators bear the cost not only of contributing to common projects, but
also of punishing the shirking of the self-interested members. If reciprocators are
commonenough,however,theself-interestedmemberswillconformtocooperative
norms in order to escape punishment, thereby reducing or eliminating the ﬁtness
differences between the reciprocators and the self-interested members. A second
argument supporting strong reciprocity is that groups with a sufﬁcient fraction of
strongreciprocatorswillbebettercapabletosurvivesuchgroupcrisesaswar,pesti-
lence, and adverse climatic conditions. In such situations, a group of self-regarding
agents would simply disband, since each member will do better to bear the personal
costs of abandoning the group rather than bearing the even heavier costs of attempt-
ing to preserve the group, most of the gains of which would accrue to other group
members. Since strong reciprocators enforce cooperation without regard for the
possibility of extinction, a sufﬁcient fraction of strong reciprocators can enhance
the possibility of group survival.
Grouplevel-characteristics—suchasrelativelysmallgroupsize, limitedmigra-
tion,orfrequentinter-groupconﬂicts—haveco-evolvedwithcooperativebehaviors.
Cooperationisthusbasedinpartonthedistinctivecapacitiesofhumanstoconstruct
institutional environments that limit within-group competition and reduce pheno-
typic variation within groups, thus heightening the relative importance of between-
group competition, and hence allowing individually-costly but ingroup-beneﬁcial
behaviors to coevolve with these supporting environments through a process of
inter-demic selection.
The idea that the suppression of within-group competition may be a strong in-
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ﬂuence on evolutionary dynamics has been widely recognized in eusocial insects
andotherspecies. Alexander(1979),Boehm(1982)andEibl-Eibesfeldt(1982)ﬁrst
applied this reasoning to human evolution, exploring the role of culturally transmit-
ted practices that reduce phenotypic variation within groups. Group-level institu-
tions thus are constructed environments capable of imparting distinctive direction
and pace to the process of biological evolution and cultural change (Friedman and
Singh 2001).
Bowles, Choi and Hopfensitz (2003) models an evolutionary dynamic along
these lines. They show that intergroup conﬂicts may explain the evolutionary suc-
cess of both altruistic forms of human sociality towards non-kin, and group-level
institutional structures such as resource sharing that have emerged and diffused
repeatedly in a wide variety of ecologies during the course of human history.
6 Proximate Motives: Internalized Norms and Social Emotions
An internal norm is a pattern of behavior enforced in part by internal sanctions, in-
cluding shame and guilt. Individuals follow internal norms when they value certain
behaviors for their own sake, in addition to, or despite, the effects these behaviors
have on personal ﬁtness and/or perceived well-being. The ability to internalize
norms is nearly universal among humans. All successful cultures foster internal
norms that enhance personal ﬁtness, such as future-orientation, good personal hy-
giene, positive work habits, and control of emotions. Cultures also widely promote
altruistic norms that subordinate the individual to group welfare, fostering such
behaviors as bravery, honesty, fairness, willingness to cooperate, and empathy with
the distress of others (Brown 1991).
Ifevenafractionofsocietyinternalizethenormsofcooperationandpunishfree
riders and other norm violators, a high degree of cooperation can be maintained in
the long run. The puzzles are two: why do we internalize norms, and why do
cultures promote cooperative behaviors? Gintis (2003) provides an evolutionary
model in which the capacity to internalize norms develops because this capacity
enhances individual ﬁtness in a world in which social behavior has become too
complex to be learned through personal experience alone. It is not difﬁcult to
show that if an internal norm is ﬁtness enhancing, then for plausible patterns of
socialization, the allele for internalization of norms is evolutionarily stable. This
framework implements the suggestion in Simon (1990) that altruistic norms can
‘hitchhike’on the general tendency of internal norms to be ﬁtness-enhancing.
Prosocial emotions are physiological and psychological reactions that induce
agents to engage in cooperative behaviors as we have deﬁned them above. The
prosocial emotions include some, such as shame, guilt, empathy, and sensitivity to
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socialsanction, thatinduceagentstoundertakeconstructivesocialinteractions, and
others, such as the desire to punish norm violators, that reduce free riding when
the prosocial emotions fail to induce sufﬁciently cooperative behavior in some
fraction of members of the social group (Frank 1987, Hirshleifer 1987). Without
the prosocial emotions we would all be sociopaths, and human society would not
exist, however strong the institutions of contract, governmental law enforcement,
and reputation. Sociopaths have no mental deﬁcit except that their capacity to
experience shame, guilt, empathy, and remorse is severely attenuated or absent.
Prosocial emotions function like the basic emotion, “pain,” in providing guides
for action that bypass the explicit cognitive optimizing process that lies at the core
of the standard behavioral model in economics. Antonio Damasio (1994):173 calls
these “somatic markers,” that is, a bodily response that “forces attention on the
negative outcome to which a given action may lead and functions as an automated
alarm signal which says: Beware of danger ahead if you choose the option that
leads to this outcome.…the automated signal protects you against future losses.”
Emotions thus contribute to the decision-making process, not simply by clouding
reason, but in beneﬁcial ways as well. Damasio continues: “suffering puts us on
notice.…it increases the probability that individuals will heed pain signals and act
to avert their source or correct their consequences.” (p. 264)
Does shame serve a purpose similar to that of pain? If being socially devalued
has ﬁtness costs, and if the amount of shame is closely correlated with the level of
these ﬁtness costs, then the answer is afﬁrmative. Shame, like pain, is an aversive
stimulus that leads the agent experiencing it to repair the situation that led to the
stimulus, and to avoid such situations in the future. Shame, like pain, replaces an
involved optimization process with a simple message: whatever you did, undo it if
possible, and do not do it again.
Since shame is evolutionarily selected and is costly to use, it very likely confers
a selective advantage on those who experience it. Two types of selective advantage
are at work here. First, shame may raise the ﬁtness of an agent who has incomplete
information (e.g., as to how ﬁtness-reducing a particular anti-social action is), lim-
ited or imperfect information-processing capacity, and/or a tendency to undervalue
costs and beneﬁt that accrue in the future. Probably all three conditions conspire
to react suboptimally to social disapprobation in the absence of shame, and shame
brings us closer to the optimum. Of course the role of shame in alerting us to neg-
ative consequences in the future presupposes that society is organized to impose
those costs on rule violators. The emotion of shame may have coevolved with the
emotions motivating punishment of antisocial actions (the reciprocity motive in our
model).
The second selective advantage to those experiencing shame arises through the
effects of group competition. Where the emotion of shame is common, punishment
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of antisocial actions will be particularly effective and as a result seldom used .Thus
groups in which shame is common can sustain high levels of group cooperation at
limited cost and will be more likely to spread through interdemic group selection
(Bowles and Gintis 2004, Boyd, Gintis, Bowles and Richerson 2003). Shame thus
serves as a means of economizing on costly within-group punishment.
While we think the evidence is strong that prosocial emotions account for im-
portant forms of human cooperation, there is no universally accepted model of
how emotions combine with more cognitive processes to affect behaviors. Nor is
there much agreement on how best to represent the prosocial emotions that support
cooperative behaviors.
Bowles and Gintis (2005) considers a public goods game where subjects maxi-
mizeautilityfunctionthatcapturesﬁvedistinctmotives: personalmaterialpayoffs,
one’s valuation of the payoffs to others, which depend both on ones’ altruism and
one’s degree of reciprocity, and one’s sense of guilt or shame when failing to con-
tribute one’s fair share to the collective effort of the group. We have evidence of
shame if players who are punished by others respond by behaving more coopera-
tively than is optimal for a material payoff-maximizing agent. We present indirect
empirical evidence suggesting that such emotions play a role in the public goods
game.
Direct evidence on the role of emotions in experimental games remains scanty.
The forms of arousal associated with emotions are readily measured, but they do
not readily allow us to distinguish between, say, fear and anger. Self reports of
emotional states are informative but noisy. Recent advances in brain imaging, how-
ever, can identify the areas of the brain that are activated when an experimental
subject is confronted with a moral dilemma or unfair treatment by another experi-
mentalsubject. ThisuseoffMRIandrelatedtechnologymayeventuallyallowusto
distinguish among the emotional responses of subjects in experimental situations.
7 Conclusion
The study of collective action and other forms of cooperative behaviors exhibits
a curious disparity among social scientists. In the Marxian tradition, and among
many historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists, the fact that
peopleoftenbehaveprosociallyinthepursuitofcommonobjectives,evenwhenthis
involvescooperatinginann-personPrisonersDilemmagame,isfrequentlyinvoked
to explain social structures and their dynamics. Among economists, biologists, and
others inﬂuenced by their models, by contrast, self-regarding actors will rarely, if
ever, cooperate in such a setting.
It may be thought that the key difference accounting for this divergence is the
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methodological individualism adopted by economists and biologists, in contrast
to the more holist or structural approaches adopted by historians and many social
scientists outside of economics. According to this view, if anthropologists, sociol-
ogists, Marxists, and others were only to ask the obvious question—why would an
individual engage in a costly activity to beneﬁt others?—they would agree with the
economists. But this is not the case.
Thequestionneedsananswer,butinlightofwhatwenowknowaboutthenature
of social preferences, it is not that altruistic forms of collective action are likely to
be an ephemeral and unimportant aspect of political life and that most forms of
seemingly altruistic cooperation are just self-interest in disguise. Like adherence
to social norms and punishment of those who violate them, collective action is an
essential aspect of political behavior and one which is readily explained by the fact
thatstrongreciprocityandothersocialpreferencesaresufﬁcientlycommoninmost
human populations to support high levels of cooperation in many social settings.
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